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Commons General Committee on Judicial Review & Courts Bill 3 November 2021 
House of Commons 
Parliament of the United Kingdom 
Submission on Judicial Review & Courts Bill 152 2021-22 (Prospective Quashing Orders) 
1.1. I am an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, 
Canada. I previously practised and taught law in London, England. My scholarly research 
concerns the overlapping doctrines of Prospective Quashing (i.e. judicially quashing 
government acts with non-retrospective effect) and Prospective Overruling (i.e. judicially 
overruling court precedents with non-retrospective effect).  
1.2. In light of my research,1 I disagree with the proposal in Clause 1(1)(29A)(1)(b) to create 
prospective-only remedies in judicial review, because: 
a. Prospective Quashing violates Professor A.V. Dicey’s canonical three meanings
of the Rule of Law:2 (i) Supremacy of law: Subsection (1)(b) allows unlawful
executive action to govern past events without remedy, enabling rule by arbitrary
power rather than rule by the regular law; (ii) Equality before law: Subsection (1)(b)
gives the Government a remedial shield in litigation that is not available to ordinary
people, which violates the principle of equality under law; (iii) Ordinary law:
Subsection (1)(b) undermines the aspiration of law that ‘where there is a right, there
is a remedy’, by abolishing the ordinary retrospective remedies for rights-violations.
b. The premise of Subsection (1)(b), ‘that legal certainty, and hence the Rule of
Law, may be best served by only prospectively invalidating’ impugned acts,3 is
contradicted by the leading mainstream theories of adjudication in the
common law world, including those advanced by Professors H.L.A. Hart, Joseph
Raz, John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin, and John Gardner.4 Subsection (1)(b) ushers in a
radical change to the judicial method without any adequate theoretical or Rule-of-
Law justification.
c. Prospective Quashing draws judges into making policy and encourages judicial
activism.5 This statutory reform has roots in an American doctrine developed by
1 Summarised in greater detail in S. Beswick, Submission on Judicial Review: Proposals for Reform – 
‘Prospective Invalidation/Overruling’, Judicial Review Reform Consultation, Ministry of Justice, UK (28 
April 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3833022.  
2 S. Beswick, ‘Prospective Overruling Offends the Rule of Law’ (2021) NEW ZEALAND LAW JOURNAL 
261, https://bit.ly/3mz29nP.  
3 The Government Response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law (CP 408, 2021) 31. 
4 S. Beswick, ‘Judicial Law-making’ (draft manuscript not yet published: https://bit.ly/3EyGZw8). 
5 S. Beswick, ‘Prospective Overruling Unravelled’ (2022) 41 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY _, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990.  
2 
reformist jurists who sought to untether US judges from the constraint of 
retrospective judicial decision-making as a way to facilitate more radical judicial 
changes in the law. The technique leads to more uncertainty, instability, and 
inefficiency in the law, and more policy balancing in the courts, not less.  
d. Prospective Quashing is inconsistent with the English common law judicial
method and the declaratory theory of adjudication that underpins common law
reasoning.6 Subsection (1)(b) would fundamentally change the nature of judging in
the UK. The idea that judges can separate the forward-looking precedential effects
of their decisions from the backward-looking retrospective effects contravenes
orthodox understandings of the common law judicial method. Lord Devlin thought
such a proposal ‘crosses the Rubicon that divides the judicial and the legislative
powers. It turns judges into undisguised legislators.’ He warned that to cross that
Rubicon—as Subsection (1)(b) does—‘would be to make a profound constitutional
change with incalculable consequences’.7
e. Prospective Quashing is doctrinally unprincipled and has been denounced by
prominent apex courts around the common law world.8 The High Court of
Australia has rejected the doctrine of judicial non-retrospectivity as ‘inconsistent
with’ and ‘a perversion of judicial power’.9 The United States Supreme Court has
abandoned it. In Canada it is a rarely-invoked exceptional resort. Subsection (1)(b)
is an unprecedented reform. It would isolate the courts of the United Kingdom from
influencing, and drawing influence from, comparable common law jurisdictions.
f. Prospective Quashing is unnecessary and has been rejected by scholars who
have analysed the doctrine in England.10 When the Government disagrees with
the reasoning or outcome of a judgment, the preferable and available solution is to
enact legislation changing the law (if necessary, with retroactive effect).
1.3. Regarding the specific provisions of Clause 1, I favour: 
a. removing subsections (1)(b) and (4) entirely;
b. in any event, removing subsection (9) so as to leave the exercise of this new power
to the discretion of the judge having regard to the context of each case.
Assistant Professor Samuel Beswick 
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6 S. Beswick, ‘The Overpaid Tax Litigation: Roadblocked’ (2021) 84 MODERN LAW REVIEW 1105, 1118–
1120, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3789334. 
7 Lord Devlin, ‘Judges and Lawmakers’ (1976) 39 MODERN LAW REVIEW 1, 11. 
8 S. Beswick, ‘Retroactive Adjudication’ (2020) 130 YALE LAW JOURNAL 276, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077. 
9 Ha v New South Wales [1997] HCA 34, (1997) 189 CLR 465, 504, affirmed in Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v 
Pentelow [2019] HCA 29, [55] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ, [94]–[98] per Edelman J. 
10 C.J.G. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 209–
227; B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2008) 209–218.  
